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ANTITRUST’S DEMOCRACY DEFICIT 
Harry First* & Spencer Weber Waller** 
 
Where does America stand? . . .  Since World War II, the United States 
has had an answer to that question.  We stand for free peoples and free 
markets. . . .  We will sustain a balance of power that favors freedom. 
—Condoleezza Rice, Speech at the Republican National Convention, 
Aug. 29, 20121 
INTRODUCTION 
Critics of lax antitrust enforcement have long bemoaned the slide of 
antitrust into political irrelevance.  Richard Hofstadter famously sounded 
the theme nearly fifty years ago.  Pointing out that the political impulses 
animating antitrust in its first half century had faded as the United States 
became comfortable with big business, he argued that postwar enforcers 
had transformed antitrust into a technical exercise managed by lawyers and 
economists:  “[O]nce the United States had an antitrust movement without 
antitrust prosecutions; in our time there have been antitrust prosecutions 
without an antitrust movement.”2  Some might go even further today, 
arguing that we lack an antitrust movement and antitrust prosecutions, as 
cartel investigations have sidetracked antitrust from its core mission of 
preventing concentrations of economic and political power. 
Many scholars have tried to explain what has caused the shift in 
antitrust’s political salience,3 but the purpose of this Article is more to 
describe how the shift has affected the way we now do the “antitrust 
enterprise” and to connect this shift to our concern for the political values 
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 1.  Condoleezza Rice, Former Sec’y of State, Speech at the Republican National 
Convention (Aug. 29, 2012), available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/29/
transcript-condoleezza-rice-speech-at-rnc/. 
 2. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE 
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 189 (1965). 
 3. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
1–10 (2005); Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain:  The Political Economy of 
the Non-interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605 
(2010). 
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that we believe underlie the antitrust laws.  Thus, we take guidance from 
two points in Secretary Rice’s speech:  First, we connect free markets with 
free people, favoring open markets that provide the opportunity to compete.  
Second, we see the connection between free markets and democratic values 
and institutions.4  As Secretary Rice also suggests (although likely with 
foreign policy in mind), we, too, believe that a balance of institutional 
power is necessary to advance the goals that free markets embody. 
The institutional aspects of today’s antitrust enterprise, however, are 
increasingly out of balance, threatening the democratic, economic, and 
political goals of the antitrust laws.5  The shift that Hofstadter first 
described has led to an antitrust system captured by lawyers and economists 
advancing their own self-referential goals, free of political control and 
economic accountability.  Some of this professional control is inevitable, of 
course, because antitrust is a system of legal ordering of economic 
relationships.  But antitrust is also public law designed to serve public ends.  
Today’s unbalanced system puts too much control in the hands of technical 
experts, moving antitrust enforcement too far away from its democratic 
roots. 
We characterize the result of this shift toward technocracy as antitrust’s 
democracy deficit.6  We draw upon the concept of a democracy deficit from 
the literature analyzing and critiquing the European Union (EU) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).7  The term has generally been used to 
 
 4. Secretary Rice’s remarks echo the views of classical liberal economists. See, e.g., 
Corwin D. Edwards, An Appraisal of the Antitrust Laws, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 172, 172 (1946) 
(“The grounds for the laws against collusion and monopoly include not only a dislike of 
restriction of output and of one-sided bargaining power, but also a desire to prevent 
excessive concentration of wealth and power and a desire to keep open the channels of 
opportunity.”). 
 5. We take as a given that antitrust has political goals and reflects political value 
judgments.  Other papers in this Symposium engage more fully with what those goals are, 
further developing a rich tradition of antitrust scholarship.  For earlier contributions, see, for 
example, Robert Bork, Ward Bowman, Harlan Blake & Kenneth Jones, The Goals of 
Antitrust:  A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); John J. Flynn, Antitrust 
Policy and the Concept of a Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 893, 897 (1990); 
Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust:  A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 
1140 (1981); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:  Political and Economic Theory in 
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989); Robert Pitofsky, The 
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Louis B. Schwartz, Justice 
and Other Non-economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); Louis B. 
Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 38 (1955) (“The purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to preserve liberty, i.e., freedom of choice and action, first in the economic 
sphere but ultimately in the political sphere as well.”). 
 6. Daniel Crane defines “technocracy” as “the insulation of a governmental function 
from popular political pressure and its administration by experts rather than generalists.” 
DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 70 (2011); 
see also Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159 (2008). 
 7. E.g., DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64–66 (1979); Robert Howse, 
How To Begin To Think About the “Democratic Deficit” at the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS 79, 79–101 (Stefan Griller ed., 
2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty:  Towards the Public 
Accountability of Global Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 159 (2004); Joseph 
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refer to policymaking by unaccountable and nontransparent technocratic 
institutions far removed from democratic (or national) control.8  The 
concern over a democracy deficit has led Europeans to develop the 
principle of subsidiarity, which seeks to direct lawmaking and enforcement, 
where possible, to the level of government closest to the people affected by 
the decisions.9  Similar concerns have led the WTO to open its dispute 
resolution proceedings to participation by nongovernmental organizations 
and other affected parties.10 
The concern for democratic decision making has also been reflected in a 
new interest in global administrative law and the importance of basic 
principles of transparency and due process as a way to control the 
administrative state.11  This interest in administrative law principles has 
likewise led to a closer examination of how well antitrust conforms to due 
process and institutional norms.12 
Our concern over antitrust’s move away from more democratically 
controlled institutions toward greater reliance on technical experts is not 
just animated by a theoretical preference for democracy.  As lawyers know, 
institutional arrangements affect outcomes.  A preference for democratic 
institutions implicitly assumes that more democratically arranged 
institutions will, in general, produce preferable antitrust policies and 
outcomes.  We think this is particularly true today, when the imbalance 
between democratic control and technocratic control has put antitrust on a 
thin diet of efficiency, one that has weakened antitrust’s ability to control 
corporate power.  Nevertheless, our concern about a democracy deficit does 
not lead us to a full-throated embrace of William Jennings Bryan–style 
 
H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 354 (1996). 
 8. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2466–
74 (1991) (describing the aspects of the democracy deficit in European Community 
institutions).  For discussion in the U.S. administrative law context, see, for example, Peter 
L. Strauss, Legislation That Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1351 (2010) (discussing the legitimacy of having unelected regulators 
creating “binding legal texts” through regulation). 
 9. For an overview, see SUBSIDIARITY AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN EUROPE (George 
Gelauff et al. eds., 2008). 
 10.   See MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24–25 (2d ed. 2006). 
 11.  See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence 
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 28 (2005) (“[G]lobal 
administrative law effectively covers all the rules and procedures that help ensure the 
accountability of global administration, and it focuses in particular on administrative 
structures, on transparency, on participatory elements in the administrative procedure, on 
principles of reasoned decisionmaking, and on mechanisms of review.”).  For fuller 
discussion of the scope of the field and current research, see Global Administrative Law 
Project, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST., N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., http://www.iilj.org/GAL/default.asp 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 12.  See THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS:  GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL 
CHOICES (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013) (studying institutional norms 
in competition law enforcement in ten jurisdictions). 
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populism.13  Political values change over time with changes in the social 
sciences and the world more generally.  Rather, we think that by redressing 
the democracy deficit we can move the needle back toward policies that 
reflect more general political understandings and views of antitrust policy, 
even if not all the way back to the nineteenth century. 
We begin our Article by discussing the democracy deficit as reflected in 
the conduct of the major institutions of the antitrust system and by 
comparing the situation in the United States with the evolving enforcement 
regime in Europe.  In the second part of the Article, we explore the link 
between technocracy and ideology, discussing how a technocratic approach 
has today come to support an extreme laissez-faire ideology for antitrust 
enforcement.  Finally, our Article concludes with some thoughts on why 
more democracy would be good for antitrust. 
I.  THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT 
Part I first charts the democracy deficit as reflected in the conduct of the 
major institutions of the antitrust system—the courts, Congress, and public 
enforcers.  It then compares the situation in the United States with the 
evolving competition law enforcement regime in Europe. 
A.  The Courts 
Perhaps the most significant innovation Congress made when it enacted 
the Sherman Act was to create a system of public enforcement of 
competition law.14  Restraints of trade had previously been largely a private 
matter, raised defensively to avoid the enforcement of contracts that were 
against public policy.15  Under the Sherman Act, however, the government 
was given the power to use judicial processes to stop agreements in restraint 
of trade and even to prosecute criminally those parties who entered into 
them.16  Private parties also gained a new right, specifically the right to sue 
for damages caused by such restraints.17  Together, these two affirmative 
rights placed decisional power in antitrust cases squarely in the hands of 
judges and juries, the former often viewed as the least democratic branch of 
government and the latter often viewed as representing the populace from 
 
 13.  For a general history of populism, see, for example, LAWRENCE GOODWYN, 
DEMOCRATIC PROMISE:  THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA (1976); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, 
THE AGE OF REFORM:  FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955). 
 14.   Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
 15.  Note that some state government antitrust enforcement did precede passage of the 
Sherman Act. See James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era:  The 
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
495, 499 (1987) (discussing state enforcement of antitrust law prior to passage of the 
Sherman Act). 
 16.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 17. Sherman Antitrust Act § 7 (superseded by 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)). 
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which it was drawn.18  Framed this way, how they exercise their powers 
will strongly affect the balance between technocracy and democracy. 
1.  Judges:  Antitrust As Common Law 
How should judges interpret the antitrust laws?  The Sherman, Clayton,19 
and Federal Trade Commission20 Acts are broadly worded, with Congress 
intentionally leaving it to the courts to fill in the exact meaning of phrases 
like “restraint of trade,” “monopolization,” “substantially to lessen 
competition,” and “unfair methods of competition,” none of which was 
statutorily defined.21  Early judicial opinions struggled with interpretation 
issues, particularly in Sherman Act cases where the courts were caught 
between the literalism of “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal”22 and the common law 
tradition of a rule of reason. 
Exemplifying the initial common law approach is Judge Taft’s circuit 
court opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.23  This opinion 
is well known for its ancillary restraints analytical framework, but it is 
perhaps less appreciated for its institutional approach in which Taft engaged 
in a broad inquiry into how the defendants’ agreement might be viewed 
under the common law. 
The “common law,” Taft knew, was hardly a seamless body, uniform in 
application; but Taft did not ignore decisions pointing in different 
directions.  Instead, he examined cases on both sides of the issue, reviewing 
cases dating back to the medieval English Year Books up until the time of 
his decision.  The jurisdictions involved were diverse—England, Canada, 
Australia, the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. federal courts, and eighteen state 
courts.24  Taft drew on these cases for their different approaches, and for the 
 
 18. For the classic text discussing the countermajoritarian problem of having judges 
review the constitutionality of legislation, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986) 
(“[J]udicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy.”).  For discussion of 
the popular role of the jury, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 28–29 (2004) (quoting John Adams for the 
proposition that the jury “introduced ‘a mixture of popular power’ into the execution of the 
law and was thus an important protection of liberty.  This was particularly true when it came 
to fundamental law, for the jury was ‘the Voice of the People.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 19. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–77; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006). 
 20. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. 
 21. See 51 CONG. REC. 4089 (1890) (“Now, just what contracts, what combinations in 
the form of trusts, or what conspiracies will be in restraint of the trade or commerce 
mentioned in the bill will not be known until the courts have construed and interpreted this 
provision.”) (remarks of Rep. Culberson) (reporting the bill on behalf of the House Judiciary 
Committee). 
 22. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 23. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 24. See id. at 279–91.  The states were Massachusetts, New York, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Illinois, Kentucky, Iowa, California, Texas, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Georgia. 
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policies these courts articulated, before determining whether the cartel 
agreement in the case violated the Sherman Act. 
Taft did not see the court as being at liberty to decide “how much 
restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is not.”  He 
was not about to “set sail on a sea of doubt” and “assume[] [such a] 
power.”25  For Taft, the common law constrained judicial power.  His 
decision needed to be within the bounds that the common law set, in part 
because the Sherman Act had made contracts that were in restraint of trade 
at common law “unlawful in an affirmative or positive sense.”26 
This sense of judicial restraint was not on display in the Supreme Court’s 
1911 decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.27  There, the Supreme 
Court chose to interpret the Sherman Act expansively, “by the light of 
reason,” to determine “in every given case whether [the conduct] was within 
the contemplation of the statute.”28  Justice Harlan, who had joined Taft in 
the circuit court in Addyston Pipe, vigorously dissented.  “[S]uch a course 
of proceeding,” he wrote, “would be ‘judicial legislation.’”29 
Congress responded to critics from all sides of the political spectrum by 
enacting the Clayton Act in 1914, trying to limit the discretion of the courts 
by writing clearer prohibitions on specific types of conduct.  Congress’s 
fear was that without greater legislative control, the legality of any 
particular restraint would be determined by a judge’s individual opinion as 
an economist or sociologist rather than by a legislatively set legal 
standard.30 
These early jousts between the courts and the legislature over the 
Sherman Act’s meaning have now been relegated to history.  The modern 
Supreme Court has come to be unmoored from any sense of legislative 
direction of judicial decision making when it comes to interpreting the 
 
 25. Id. at 284. 
 26. Id. at 279. 
 27. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 28. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. at 100 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  As President, Taft 
subsequently took the position that Standard Oil “merely adopted the tests of the common 
law” and that no prior case would have been decided differently under its approach. See 
Annual Message—Part I, On the Anti-Trust Statute, 17 COMP. MESSAGES & PAPERS PRES. 
7644, 7645–46 (1911).  But he also argued that the Court had not committed to itself 
“unlimited discretion” to decide a restraint’s illegality, repeating the approach he had taken 
in Addyston Pipe: 
A reasonable restraint of trade at common law is well understood and is clearly 
defined.  It does not rest in the discretion of the court.  It must be limited to 
accomplish the purpose of a lawful main contract to which, in order that it shall be 
enforceable at all, it must be incidental.  If it exceed the needs of that contract, it is 
void. 
Id. at 7646; see also Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil As Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 783, 797 (2012) (discussing Taft’s view of Standard Oil). 
 30. See S. REP. NO. 62-1326, at 11 (1913). 
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antitrust laws.31  Although some modern cases take a default view of 
appropriate antitrust rules—make a decision while reminding Congress of 
its legislative responsibility to alter it32—even that modest 
acknowledgement of legislative authority is lacking today. 
Instead, the Supreme Court now refers to the “quasi–common law realm 
of antitrust,”33 writing that the Sherman Act’s use of the term “‘restraint of 
trade’ invokes the common law itself.”34  But now the Court does not mean 
a common law of bounded precedent, to be parsed and reconciled as Taft 
did in Addyston Pipe, but law made by judges as they see fit.  This 
expansive view of the Court’s powers allowed the Supreme Court in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. to overrule Dr. Miles Medical 
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,35 a nearly 100-year-old precedent whose 
congressional endorsement an earlier Supreme Court opinion had actually 
recognized and deferred to.36 
Even Justice Scalia, an originalist, has come to emphasize the “dynamic 
potential” of the term “restraint of trade.”37  “[L]ike the term at common 
law,” he wrote for the Court in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp 
Electronics, Inc., “restraint of trade” refers to a “particular economic 
consequence,” one to be assessed as “new circumstances and new wisdom” 
evolve, not one “governed by 19th-century notions of reasonableness” that 
“remain[] forever fixed where it was.”38  The question is no longer whether 
a practice in question is one that common law courts might have recognized 
as unlawful, as Taft thought in Addyston Pipe, but whether a modern judge 
thinks the practice is good or bad, the very approach that Taft rejected. 
The willingness of the courts in antitrust cases to act as unconstrained 
common law courts, ignoring any boundaries the legislature may have 
placed on the antitrust laws, has been particularly pronounced when the 
courts have interpreted the Clayton Act.  This is ironic because the Clayton 
Act is the very statute that Congress passed to stop judges from deciding 
cases based on their “individual opinion[s] as an economist.”39 
Take the prohibition on primary-line price discrimination in section 2 of 
the Clayton Act.  In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., a suit brought under section 2 of the Clayton Act, the Court 
 
 31. Cf. Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism:  When the Supreme Court Is No 
Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161 (2011) (discussing unconstrained Supreme Court 
decision making in other areas of the law). 
 32. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 33. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999). 
 34. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007). 
 35. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. 877. 
 36. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.18 (1977) (referring to 
Congress’s enactment of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 
Stat. 801 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (2006)), repealing the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade 
Act, ch. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), and the McGuire Act, ch, 745, 66 Stat. 631 
(1952)). 
 37. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs., Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). 
 38. Id. at 731–32. 
 39. See S. REP. NO. 62-1326, at 11 (1913). 
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collapsed primary-line price discrimination into the Sherman Act’s 
monopolization offense, and then applied a legal standard that assumed that 
predatory pricing almost never occurs, without ever acknowledging that 
Congress thought otherwise when it passed the Clayton Act.40  Similarly, 
the ban on exclusive dealing in section 3 of the Clayton Act has been 
subsumed by section 2 of the Sherman Act.  If anything, it is harder today 
to prove a Clayton Act violation than a Sherman Act violation, a judicial 
flip of the legislative effort to tighten up the Sherman Act’s standards when 
judging exclusive dealing arrangements.41 
A similarly egregious example of ignoring the Clayton Act involves the 
practice of tying, where the provision of one product or service is 
conditioned on the acceptance of a second product or service.  Tying can be 
challenged under four separate statutory provisions, each with its own 
language, legislative history, and purpose.  There are tying cases under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act barring agreements in restraint of trade,42 
section 2 of the Sherman Act barring monopolization or attempted 
monopolization,43 section 3 of the later-enacted Clayton Act barring the 
sale of goods on the condition that the purchaser shall not use or deal in the 
goods of a competitor where the effect may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly,44 and section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act barring unfair methods of competition.45  Despite 
the disparate language and aims, the Supreme Court has collapsed tying 
 
 40. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 
(1993) (“[W]hether the claim alleges predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act or 
primary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, two prerequisites to 
recovery remain the same.”).  The Court repeated its view, originally asserted in Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589–90 (1986), that “predatory 
pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful,” see Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 
U.S. at 226, despite the fact that Congress in 1914 relied on social science views to the 
contrary, see William S. Stevens, Unfair Competition, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 282, 284–86 (1914) 
(describing geographic predatory pricing). 
 41. See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing 
a district court decision that exclusive dealing agreements did not violate section 2; although 
the government alleged a Clayton Act violation at trial, the government did not appeal the 
district court’s adverse finding on this claim); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff on section 2 claim of exclusive 
dealing; on Clayton Act exclusive dealing claim, jury had found for the defendant); cf. 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
exclusive dealing agreements violated section 2, where those agreements were challenged 
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the government plaintiffs did not appeal the 
district court’s adverse finding on the section 1 claim). 
 42. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (tying loans 
to prefabricated houses). 
 43. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (tying 
advertising in morning newspaper to advertising in evening newspaper). 
 44. See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying canning 
machinery to salt). 
 45. See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (tying tanks and pumps to 
gasoline). 
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analysis into a single quasi–per se analysis of its own making, regardless of 
which (or how many) statutes are involved.46 
The evolution of section 7 of the Clayton Act is even more dramatic.  
Interpretation of this provision is now so far removed from the legislative 
purposes that animated it that it is hard see the connection between the 
statute and current interpretations.  The Court started out in Brown Shoe Co. 
v. United States47 with a faithful effort to interpret the 1950 Cellar-
Kefauver amendment to section 7 in light of its legislative purposes,48 and 
the Court’s decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank49 the 
following year made an effort to tie its invented legal/economic test to 
section 7’s concern for concentration.50  But a decade later, in United States 
v. General Dynamics,51 the Court relegated concentration to a starting point 
in the analysis and invited defendants to come up with their own (more 
persuasive) economic theories for showing that big mergers do not hurt 
competition.52  Ever more sophisticated economic theories have now led 
merger analysis down the rabbit hole into a world where the government is 
forced to vigorously litigate mergers at very high levels of concentration.  
We are now lucky if we can stop a three-to-two merger—forget a merger 
that threatens competition in its incipiency.53 
No one would contend that the federal judiciary is an institution subject 
to much democratic control.  Its members are not elected and are practically 
unremovable from their offices.  But control over the meaning of the 
antitrust laws is now firmly in the grip of this unelected judiciary that feels 
 
 46. See Jefferson Parrish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); see also 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE ¶ 10.3 (4th ed. 2011). 
 47. 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962). 
 48. See id. (“The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 
amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration 
in the American economy.”). 
 49. 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). 
 50. See id. (justifying a test for presuming anticompetitive effect as being warranted by 
the “intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration”). 
 51. 415 U.S. 486, 497–98 (1974). 
 52. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974) (noting 
that, after the government introduced evidence of concentration ratios, defendant could then 
explain why concentration ratios were “unreliable indicators of actual market behavior”); 
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 497–98 (holding that, despite sufficient statistical 
showing, “other pertinent factors” affecting the industry and the merging parties’ business 
properly led the district court to find a lack of substantial effect on competition). 
 53. See United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 92 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(enjoining, after trial on the merits, a merger creating duopoly in the “digital do-it-yourself 
tax preparation” market); cf. Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 11-
01560 (ESH) (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f275100/275128.pdf (action to enjoin four-to-three merger in mobile wireless 
telecommunications services market).  AT&T subsequently abandoned the acquisition. See 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Issues Statements Regarding AT&T Inc.’s 
Abandonment of Its Proposed Acquisition of T-Mobile USA Inc. (Dec. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/278406.pdf; cf. United States v. 
Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding no violation of section 7 in an 
alleged three-to-two merger). 
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free to pay little attention to the goals that Congress was trying to advance 
when the laws were enacted.  Although the judicial exercise of “legislative 
power” has always been of concern in our legal and political system and is 
at the heart of criticism of the power of constitutional judicial review, no 
one seems to notice its exercise or care when antitrust is involved. 
2.  The Jury 
Juries help democratize antitrust.  Juries are composed of lay people—
citizens who are not experts in antitrust.  Their function is not to articulate 
the law but to understand the evidence presented to them and to decide 
whether the plaintiff has proven the facts that are required for liability, 
based on the legal principles that the judge describes.  The jury’s important 
role thus forces lawyers to present their cases in ways that will make sense 
to lay people.  This means that antitrust claims and antitrust defenses must 
be comprehensible, not cloaked in professional jargon. 
How well do antitrust juries do their job?  Who knows.  There are many 
jury studies, but almost none focused on antitrust.54  Some federal judges 
think juries do a good job; presumably, others do not.55  But most antitrust 
commentators today think that juries are anathema to antitrust.56  As Daniel 
Crane points out, “Few institutions could be further from the technocratic 
model of expert administration than a randomly selected group of lay fact 
 
 54. See CRANE, supra note 6, at 111 (“To my knowledge, there have been no systematic 
efforts to study the actual performance of civil antitrust juries.”).  Crane does, however, draw 
on one study, done using juror interviews after four antitrust trials in the 1990s. See id. 
(calling these juror interviews “the richest pool of information [available]”).  Note, the 
study’s author and Crane emphasize the conclusions only from one of those trials. See 
Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 
DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 52–60 (1995) (discussing the trial in Brooke Group Ltd.).  For a much 
more positive conclusion regarding the jury’s abilities, see Shari Seidman Diamond & 
Jessica M. Salerno, Empirical Analysis of Juries in Tort Cases, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (J. Arlen ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/11.Empirical%20Analysis%20of%20Jurors-
Diamond.pdf (concluding that “juries usually use reasonable strategies to evaluate the 
conflicting evidence they are given” and are “active problem-solvers who typically work to 
produce defensible verdicts”). 
 55. Judge Lewis Kaplan, for example, has observed that in his seventeen years as a trial 
judge on the federal bench, he thought that all the juries in the cases before him had 
understood the cases they were presented, with the exception of one patent case. See Email 
from Judge Lewis Kaplan, S.D.N.Y., to Harry First (Dec. 19, 2012, 4:36 PM) (on file with 
author) (reflecting on remarks made in a 2011 speech to the Executive Committee of the 
New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section); see also Richard S. Arnold, Trial 
by Jury:  The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 
2–3 (1993) (“When I served as a district judge for about eighteen months, I was fond of 
telling jurors in my courtroom that I would prefer to have a case decided by twelve ordinary 
people than by one ordinary person. In other words, I do not believe much in expertise, and 
if there is such a thing, I doubt if it is any match for common sense.”). 
 56. See CRANE, supra note 6, at 109 (listing several commentators); see also Rebecca 
Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation:  Losing Academic Consensus in the 
Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1293 (2012) (noting that the problems with 
jury decision making in antitrust “have been well documented,” with issues of economic 
debate that are “beyond the ken of lay people” being resolved by a lay decision maker). 
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finders.”57  Juries, in Crane’s view, are “populist” institutions and “antitrust 
populism is long dead.”58 
In one sense, this hostility to juries in antitrust cases seems almost 
irrelevant.  Jury use is limited in the antitrust system because a jury is 
required only in suits for damages and in criminal cases—government 
enforcement actions seeking injunctive relief are tried only to a judge.  This 
means that there will be no jury involvement with much of what might 
present conflicts in terms of antitrust policy—mergers, monopolization, and 
collaborative activities other than price fixing.  Further, trials are generally 
rare in federal court anyway, whether in civil or criminal cases; most cases 
end in a settlement or a guilty plea.  This is certainly true for antitrust.59  
For example, of the more than 200 private cases filed against Microsoft in 
the aftermath of the government monopolization case, only two ever went 
to trial before a jury and only one to a conclusion; all the others were either 
dismissed or settled.60  Why be so upset about an institution so rarely 
invoked? 
Two reasons help explain this hostility.  One we have already noted—the 
general preference that antitrust be kept in the hands of experts versed in the 
intricacies of antitrust law and economic theory.  The other is likely more 
significant—hostility to the private action itself and the fear that large 
settlements will occur in the shadow of a populist jury that hates big 
business and does not understand economic terms like “average variable 
cost” or “elasticity of demand.”61 
 
 57. CRANE, supra note 6, at 113. 
 58. Id. 
 59. For example, of the 641 federal civil antitrust cases terminated in Fiscal Year 2011, 
only five terminated during or after a jury trial, which is less than 1 percent (0.78%) of the 
total civil antitrust cases filed.  This is slightly higher than the percentage of all civil cases 
filed that year that went to a jury trial (0.74%).  Most civil antitrust cases ended (presumably 
by settlement) before or during pretrial proceedings (79%), slightly lower than the number 
for all civil cases (82%). See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR:  JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 149–50 tbl.C-4 (2012), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/Judicial
Business2011.pdf. 
 60. See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:04-cv-01045-JFM, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 98710, at *5–6 nn.4 & 5 (D. Utah July 16, 2012) (granting Microsoft’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law after the jury had hung, 11–1, in favor of Novell), appeal 
docketed, No. 12-4143 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2012); Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5994, 
2001 WL 366432 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2001) (granting class certification).  The Gordon case 
was settled during the trial for $182 million.  For an interesting discussion of the trial, 
belying the skeptical account of jurors’ abilities to understand complex antitrust cases, see 
“Gordon v. Microsoft”:  Observations from the Trial Judge and Selected Jurors, AM. BAR. 
ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2004), http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-trial/pdf/past-
programs/gordon-transcript-04.pdf [hereinafter Observations]. 
 61. See CRANE, supra note 6, at 111 (citing Austin, supra note 54).  Curiously, Crane 
cites one experimental study showing that juries would award lower damages if they were 
told that damages were automatically trebled to support his view that jury trials “may be 
tilted in a populist anti-big business direction.” See id. at 112–13.  To the contrary, this 
finding indicates that jurors are not biased against corporations, because they would want to 
reduce the damages award if they had full information; if anything, this finding reveals a 
“bias” against plaintiffs who are, by law, entitled to treble-damages.  One juror in the 
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Fear of improperly exacted large settlements has given the antijury 
critique important consequence for antitrust law.  Beginning with In re 
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation in the 1970s—in which 
the defendants argued that there should be no constitutional right to a jury 
trial because the case was too complex62—the Supreme Court has engaged 
in a relentless effort to keep antitrust away from juries.  In the Japanese 
consumer electronics case the Court took a defendant-favorable approach to 
summary judgment motions, ignoring its earlier, more permissive 
precedents, and cut off the plaintiffs’ attempt to present their predatory 
pricing claim to the jury.63  Then came cases adopting stricter standards for 
plaintiffs to prove causation and standing.64  Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, raised the pleading 
standard so as to make it easier for a defendant to get a case dismissed at the 
complaint stage, even before filing an answer—let alone submitting to any 
discovery.65  Most recently, the courts have focused on class certification, 
raising the requirements for showing predominance of common issues in a 
way that pushes much of the litigation into the class certification stage.66  
The hearing on class certification, of course, is held before a judge, not a 
jury. 
This hostility to private antitrust litigation, which is shared by many 
commentators, lawyers, and courts, is another example of the democracy 
deficit in the antitrust system.  Private litigation is a democratizing force in 
 
Gordon case indicated that she “might have lowered the amount” of damages had she known 
about treble-damages. See Observations, supra note 60, at 18. 
 62. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079, 1089 (3d Cir. 
1980) (holding that a case involving Sherman Act and Antidumping Act claims might be 
“too complex” for a jury to decide “in a proper manner,” with the result that a jury trial 
“would violate due process and therefore would be beyond the guarantee of the seventh 
amendment,” and remanding for further proceedings). 
 63. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596–98 
(1986). 
 64. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions To Dismiss, and Other Examples 
of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986). 
 65. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  One explanation for the 
Court’s hostility has been the near-total absence of Supreme Court Justices with any 
substantial civil trial experience.  Justice Stevens was a notable exception, having been an 
experienced antitrust litigator prior to his appointment to the bench. See Spencer Weber 
Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 SMU L. REV. 693, 697–98 (2009). 
 66. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(denying class certification); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. 
Ct. 1758 (2010) (restricting the use of class actions in arbitration).  In Behrend v. Comcast 
Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit took a less restrictive view of class 
certification, but the Court has now granted certiorari to review the decision. See Behrend, 
655 F.3d 182, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 24 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-864).  The transcript 
of the Supreme Court oral argument is available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-864.pdf.  These cases have had a noxious effect on 
the ability of all types of plaintiffs to recover money damages in federal courts, as the Court 
has extended their principles beyond antitrust litigation. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009) (extending Twombly to a suit for damages from unconstitutional conduct); Anza 
v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006) (requiring allegation of proximate cause in 
a RICO damages suit). 
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antitrust, like the jury itself, allowing injured citizens to seek redress for 
injuries suffered.  Private litigation is not in the control of government 
enforcers nor antitrust experts, although private litigants must necessarily 
employ them.  Private citizens and business firms do not care so much for 
antitrust theory as they care about getting damages for anticompetitive 
conduct that has harmed them or, in the case of businesses, stopping 
behavior that makes it hard for them to compete. 
Viewing antitrust as a technical enterprise leads today’s antitrust system 
away from private enforcement and toward public enforcement, firmly in 
the hands of expert federal enforcement agencies.  How else to explain 
Justice Breyer’s otherwise cryptic remark in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. 
LinkLine Communications, Inc., (a private treble-damages suit) that a price 
squeeze claim finds its “natural home in a Sherman Act § 2 monopolization 
case where the Government as plaintiff seeks to show that a defendant’s 
monopoly power rests, not upon ‘skill, foresight and industry,’ but upon 
exclusionary conduct”?67  Why mention only the Government?  Why not 
private litigants as well?  Don’t private litigants understand full well when 
they have been excluded by monopolizing conduct?  Or does Justice Breyer 
believe that the Sherman Act should be judicially rewritten to provide a 
separate substantive right enforceable only by expert government 
agencies?68 
B.  Fear and Loathing of Congress 
Congress is the natural democratic repository of lawmaking authority in 
our system.  Congress passes the statutory framework for substantive 
antitrust law, exemptions and immunities, the procedures for its 
enforcement, the penalties for its violation, and the institutions for its 
enforcement.  However, in recent times, Congress has seen fit only to 
nibble at the edges of antitrust law with increased penalties, minor 
amendments, and uneventful hearings over individual mergers or 
investigations of interest to particular congressional committees.  Most 
 
 67. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 458 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. 
Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007) (expressing concern that private antitrust suits 
involving the marketing of initial public offerings would be brought before “different 
nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries” reaching inconsistent verdicts, resulting in 
“unusually serious mistakes”). 
 68. It may be that Justice Breyer was implicitly referencing the debate over whether 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act can be read more broadly than section 2 in 
appropriate monopolization cases, in part because section 5 is enforceable only by the FTC 
and not by private parties. See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy 
and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 
929, 939, 947–50 (2010); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Wading into Pandora’s Box:  
Thoughts on Unanswered Questions Concerning the Scope and Application of Section 2 & 
Some Further Observations on Section 5, Remarks Before the LECG Newport Summit on 
Antitrust Law & Economics 25 (Oct. 3, 2009), available at ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091003
roschlecgspeech.pdf (discussing the lack of spillover effects on private enforcement from 
using section 5). 
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observers are content or pleased with the virtual withdrawal of Congress 
from the field,69 but even at a time of nearly universal dislike for Congress, 
we think that both branches of Congress should be expected to do better. 
Congress’s task as the legislative branch is first and foremost to pass 
laws, but that is not its only task.  Congress also appropriates money, 
provides advice and consent to presidential appointments, broadly oversees 
executive branch and independent agency activity, conducts investigations, 
holds hearings, and enacts resolutions.  But despite a history of bipartisan 
congressional support for the importance of the antitrust laws and their 
enforcement,70 of late Congress has done little.  And when it has done 
something, it has focused on the micro rather than the macro changes that 
have occurred in the field. 
A review of Congress’s activities in the antitrust field makes this rather 
dismal picture clear.  Large-scale reviews of antitrust policy and practice 
have been farmed out to third-party blue ribbon commissions whose reports 
are then generally ignored.71  This is illustrated by the fact that the last 
major amendments to the antitrust laws occurred in the 1970s, consisting of 
the elevation of antitrust crimes to felonies72 and the passage of the Tunney 
Act—requiring judicial oversight for government consent decrees73—and 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act—requiring premerger notification for large 
mergers and acquisitions74 and giving state attorneys general the right to 
sue for money damages on behalf of their natural citizens (a right the 
Supreme Court subsequently defanged in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois).75 
Since that time, Congress has increased statutory criminal penalties (but 
without changing the Sentencing Guidelines),76 established zero or single 
damages instead of treble damages for certain limited categories of private 
litigation,77 repealed a portion of baseball’s judicially created antitrust 
 
 69. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 42–45. 
 70. See Deborah K. Owen, Antitrust Under the Watchful Eye of a Conservative 
Congress, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 1 (1996); Joe Sims, Report of the President’s Commission 
on Antitrust, REGULATION, March/April 1979, at 25, 25. 
 71. The most recent is the 2007 report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission. See 
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N:  REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) [hereinafter 
AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc
_final_report.pdf. See generally Stephen Calkins, Antitrust Modernization:  Looking 
Backwards, 31 J. CORP. L. 421, 430–31 (2006); Albert A. Foer, The Antitrust Modernization 
Commission:  A Retrospective from the Perspective of the American Antitrust Institute, 54 
ANTITRUST BULL. 305, 306 (2009). 
 72. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006). 
 74. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. 94-435, tit. II, 90 Stat. 1383 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a). 
 75. See 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 76. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-
237, § 215 (raising criminal fines and imprisonment).  The U.S. Sentencing Commission did 
alter the antitrust guideline after passage of the Act to make the penalties similar to those for 
sophisticated frauds. See 3 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at 146 (2011). 
 77. See Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233, tit. III 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4021) (providing immunity from suit); Local 
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immunity,78 and granted a new immunity to teaching hospitals and medical 
schools that were on the verge of losing a private antitrust case challenging 
the match program for medical residents.79  It has fitfully considered, but 
failed to enact, antitrust amendments that would have limited certain 
defenses related to OPEC’s antitrust liability in the United States,80 reduced 
certain industry exemptions,81 overruled the Leegin and Illinois Brick 
decisions,82 and jettisoned section 7 of the Clayton Act.83  It has passed, but 
eventually discontinued, budget riders prohibiting the use of funds to 
overturn the per se ban on resale price maintenance.84  It has expressed its 
displeasure regarding formalizing the allocation of specific matters and turf 
more generally between the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade 
 
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-544, § 2, 98 Stat. 2750, 2750 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 34–36) (no damages); National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-
462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306) (detrebling). 
 78. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 27a). 
 79. See Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596, 611 
(codified at 15 U.S.C § 37b).  Senator Kohl strongly condemned the statute on the Senate 
floor as “nothing more than a giveaway to one particular special interest,” to no effect. See 
150 CONG. REC. 6812, 6833 (2004).  For exploration of the potential competitive merits of 
the match process, see Kristin Madison, The Residency Match:  Competitive Restraints In An 
Imperfect World, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 759 (2005). 
 80. See No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act (NOPEC) of 2008, H.R. 6074, 
110th Cong., (2008).  The bill passed the House but died in the Senate on a threat of a veto 
by President George W. Bush. See House Passes Bill To Expose OPEC to Antitrust 
Challenge, 94 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 516 (May 23, 2008). 
 81. In the 2010 health care reform effort, there was a modest provision that would have 
removed the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s insurance exemption for “person[s] engaged in the 
business of health insurance . . . or . . . the business of medical malpractice insurance.” See 
Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 262 (2009).  The 
provision was taken out prior to the passage of the legislation. See Preservation of Access to 
Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-192, 124 Stat. 
1280.  For an explanation of the bill proposing to remove the exemption, including a 
discussion of previous efforts to repeal or scale back the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see H.R. 
REP. NO. 111-322 (2009). 
 82. See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 2261, 110th Cong. (2007) (to 
overrule Leegin); Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick:  A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 19, 26 (2004) (discussing bills to repeal Illinois Brick, all of 
which died in committee). 
 83. See Merger Modernization Act of 1986, H.R. 4247, 99th Cong. (1986) (altering the 
language of the Clayton Act to codify aspects of the Justice Department Merger Guidelines). 
See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Reagan Administration’s Legislative Initiative in 
Antitrust, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 851 (1986). 
 84. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983) 
(“None of the funds appropriated in title I and title II of this Act may be used for any 
activity, the purpose of which is to overturn or alter the per se prohibition on resale price 
maintenance in effect under Federal antitrust laws:  Provided, That nothing in this provision 
shall prohibit any employee of a department or agency for which funds are provided in titles 
I and II of this Act from presenting testimony on this matter before appropriate committees 
of the House and Senate.”). 
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Commission.85  At its pettiest, it has sought to force the Federal Trade 
Commission to vacate its headquarters so that the National Gallery of Art 
could take over the space.86  Different committees have conducted the 
required hearings for appointments of the key governmental enforcers as 
well the occasional hearing on a specific matter of committee interest.87  
Budgets have been increased and tightened in different eras with only 
limited controversy. 
This raises two different questions.  Why is Congress afraid of antitrust 
and so focused on trivia, and why is the antitrust community afraid of 
Congress?  One possible answer to the first question is that the technocratic 
wall that antitrust professionals have built around antitrust has simply 
scared Congress away from the area.  In turn, the answer to the second 
question may be that the antitrust professional community fears that a 
breach of this wall could only lead to mischief, with untutored “business 
interest” legislators trying to dismantle antitrust law while “populist” 
legislators try to impose excessive restrictions on economic activity. 
Of course, it is possible that Congress has not been scared off, but is 
simply disinterested in antitrust or content with the status quo.  The most 
jaded public choice advocates would contend that there is not enough 
payoff in the form of either electoral support or financial campaign support 
to justify more investment in the field versus other areas of the law.  Under 
this theory the disinterest is perfectly rational.  All we are left with, then, is 
an effort by the different congressional committees to protect their turf for 
self-aggrandizing reasons, an effort most on display in the “outrage” over 
the agencies’ efforts to fix the merger clearance process. 
Putting such cynical explanations aside, as an institutional matter we 
should not assume that Congress is simply content with the status quo.  The 
historic delegation of authority to the courts to develop a common law of 
antitrust never included carte blanche authority to make fundamental 
economic public policy in the guise of case decisions.  Nor did it 
encompass the right for the agencies to increasingly make law in house 
through unreviewable decisions not to enforce the law, decisions to settle 
without effective relief, the issuance of advisory opinions, and the issuance 
of guidelines which effectively change the law, all without even resorting to 
the courts or Congress.88 
The sad fact is, however, that Congress has acquiesced in its own 
marginalization.  There is certainly a limit to the amount of attention that 
 
 85. See Harry First, Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel E. Hemli, The United States:  The 
Competition Law System and the Country’s Norms, in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAWS, 
supra note 12, at 375 & nn.261–63 (describing the congressional dispute). 
 86. See Andy Medici, GSA Leases Held up in Real Estate Power Play, FED. TIMES, June 
18, 2012, at 1. 
 87. See Peter Lattman, Senate Confirms Antitrust Chief for Justice Department, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at B2 (discussing delays in the confirmation process). 
 88. See Richard Steuer, Counseling Without Case Law, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 823 (1995); 
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation:  The Changing Nature of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998). 
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Congress can pay to any area of the law, and we do not claim that antitrust 
should be a top national priority.  This trend is compounded by the 
judiciary, which has made antitrust overly technical and primarily 
dependent on economics in such a way that it is hard to discern whether or 
not an area of the law or an individual decision is consistent with the 
statutory scheme and current congressional desire. 
Congressional distance from core antitrust policy is further compounded 
by the Court’s tendency to simply ignore the work of Congress even when 
it has expressed a view on any of these issues.  For example, in the Leegin 
case, the Supreme Court gave no significance to Congress’s awareness of a 
consistent judicial interpretation of the per se illegality of resale price 
maintenance at the federal level, a repeal of the statutes that allowed states 
to form a contrary policy under certain circumstances, and a budget rider 
that came in response to an expressed goal of the Justice Department to 
change the law in the 1980s.89  Congressional failure to respond to the 
Court then just confirms the judiciary’s view that it can act free from 
democratic control. 
Congress should be able to do better.  As in other areas of the law, 
Congress tends to focus on short-term, partisan, and publicity driven 
activity that often results in gridlock and focuses on the minutiae.  Instead 
of substantive legislation that would expand or restrict the antitrust laws in 
accordance with the will of the majority of the legislature, we are treated to 
the spectacle of sideshows like multiple hearings over the antitrust status of 
baseball,90 browbeating agency nominees over the perceived failures of the 
agencies in individual matters,91 and other oversight hearings about a 
particular merger (Universal-EMI) or high-profile industries (Google) that 
are newsworthy.92  In contrast, Congress remained entirely silent when (1) 
the 2008 Department of Justice report on unilateral conduct made important 
and wide sweeping changes to the interpretation and enforcement of section 
2;93 (2) the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) refused to sign the report and 
 
 89. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 919 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (2007); cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (deferring to congressional 
silence regarding the fifty-year-old decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. 
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), which gave 
professional baseball an effective exemption from federal antitrust law). 
 90. See Adam Berenbak, Congressional Play-by-Play on Baseball, PROLOGUE, Summer 
2011, at 24. 
 91. See Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 92. See The Universal Music Group/EMI Merger and the Future of Online Music:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012); The Power of Google:  Serving Consumers 
or Threatening Competition?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition 
Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 93. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY:  SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/
reports/236681.pdf. 
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issued policy statements in response;94 and (3) the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) report was withdrawn by the subsequent Administration.95 
As a result, both agencies and courts have the best of both worlds and 
would oppose any change where Congress reasserts its fundamental role in 
setting the public policy to be enforced by the other branches of 
government.  Agencies can proceed with fewer constraints in setting the 
agenda rather than executing one set by others.  Most of their work can 
proceed behind closed doors and by negotiation with affected parties 
without external review.96  When the courts become involved because of 
settlement break down, they can establish their own view of sound public 
policy largely unconstrained by their coequal branches of government.97 
A realistic and more democratic role for Congress in the formulation of 
competition policy, as a fundamental part of national economic policy, 
would involve a number of relatively small changes.  The first principle 
should be establishing a norm of statutory interpretation that silence after a 
Court decision does not mean acquiescence.  The fact that Congress does 
not specifically tee up a bill or resolution in each legislative session does 
not mean it has changed its mind on a particular subject or approves of a 
particular development in the antitrust world.  Second, Congress should 
require the agencies periodically to report changes in enforcement or budget 
priorities and judicial changes in established precedent.  Third, exemptions 
and immunities should be retrofitted to include sunset provisions so that 
Congress is required to take some action to preserve the status quo.98  
Fourth, if Congress outsources big-picture studies to blue ribbon 
commissions, such action should be accompanied by a provision that the 
recommendations of the commission be introduced in the following 
legislative session.  Fifth, nomination, oversight, and budget hearings 
should be better focused on the major themes of what agencies do and don’t 
do, rather than the minutiae of the moment. 
The recommendation that Congress shift its focus to major issues is 
particularly critical to reinvigorating Congress’s role in antitrust policy.  It 
 
 94. Press Release, FTC, FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice Report, 
“Competition and Monopoly:  Single Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act” 
(Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm. 
 95. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust 
Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-at-
459.html. 
 96. The Government in the Sunshine Act, however, limits private discussion of 
commission business to no more than two commissioners at a time. See Pub. L. No. 94-409, 
90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (2006)).  The FTC has criticized this 
limitation. See Stephen Calkins, Gen. Counsel, FTC, Prepared Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission Before the Special Committee To Review the Government in the 
Sunshine Act, Administrative Conference of the United States (Sept. 12, 1995), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/suntest.shtm. 
 97. One would hope that public choice advocates focused on the self-interested 
expansion of governmental actors without regard to the public interest would be as 
concerned with this situation as with their usual topics of interest. 
 98. See AMC REPORT, supra note 71, at 355–56 (recommending the adoption of a sunset 
provision for any antitrust exemption). 
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is simply more important to probe whether merger enforcement has now 
been virtually limited to mergers to monopoly than to hold hearings into 
whether a particular merger in a particular industry is a good idea.  
Similarly, reasonable people can differ over whether a particular antitrust 
provision should be enforced more vigorously, less vigorously, or simply 
repealed, but we doubt any Congress since the passage of the Sherman Act 
would simply say, “We don’t care, do whatever you want.”  We may not 
like the results of what Congress says on any particular issue, but it remains 
the only directly democratically accountable branch of government and the 
one most clearly charged with setting the broad parameters of fundamental 
public policy.  It should speak, as it does in most other areas of our complex 
economy, and not have its silence used as an excuse for self-interested 
actors to shift power in their favor when the legislature chooses to turn to 
other pressing issues of the day. 
C.  State Enforcement 
There is one group of public antitrust enforcers that has been consistently 
criticized over the past two decades, not for over- or underenforcement of 
the antitrust laws, but for having the authority to enforce the antitrust laws 
in the first place.  That group is the state attorneys general.  Many antitrust 
commentators, some federal judges, and some in Congress have been 
unhappy with an enforcement structure that has given authority to state 
attorneys general to enforce federal antitrust law in federal court, to the 
point where some have proposed ending or limiting state jurisdiction over 
all antitrust claims, whether brought under federal or state antitrust law.99  
Indeed, the effort to strip states of jurisdiction in antitrust matters was an 
important part of the agenda of the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
appointed in the mid-2000s, although this extreme view was eventually 
rejected by all but one of the Commissioners.100 
 
 99. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by 
State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT:  ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252, 260–62 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) 
(arguing that the states should be stripped of their authority to bring antitrust suits under 
either state or federal law or, at least, that Congress should preempt state antitrust law insofar 
as it might affect interstate or foreign commerce); Memorandum from AMC Staff to All 
Comm’rs 9–24 (May 19, 2006), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/pdf/
meetings/EnfInst_State_DiscMemo_pub.pdf (discussing various commentators’ criticisms of 
state enforcement and proposals to restrict or eliminate state authority); see also Richard A. 
Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001) [hereinafter 
Posner, Antitrust and the New Economy] (proposing that states should have no authority to 
bring antitrust suits under federal or state law, except where the state was injured as a 
purchaser of goods or services). 
 100. The Commissioner was John Warden. See AMC REPORT, supra note 71, at 444–45 
(statement of John Warden).  Warden had represented Microsoft Corp. in the monopolization 
litigation brought against it by the federal and state governments. See Harry First, 
Modernizing State Antitrust Enforcement:  Making the Best of a Good Situation, 54 
ANTITRUST BULL. 281, 283–91 (2009) (discussing AMC effort). See generally Richard 
Wolfram & Spencer Weber Waller, Contemporary Antitrust Federalism:  Cluster Bombs or 
Rough Justice?, in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 1 (Robert L. Hubbard & Pamela 
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From the point of view of democratic accountability, the criticism of the 
state attorneys general is deeply ironic because nearly all the state attorneys 
general are elected officials.101  Having antitrust enforcers directly 
accountable to the electorate is probably unique in the world, perhaps 
another example of the United States’ vaunted exceptionalism.  One might 
even think that this political accountability would be held up to other 
regimes around the world as an example to be followed, rather than as 
something we ought cripple or dismantle as soon as possible. 
The fact that democratic accountability for antitrust enforcement is 
roundly condemned once again reveals the strong preference we have for 
keeping antitrust away from democratic control and firmly in the hands of 
antitrust professionals.  This preference was less clear when the antitrust 
laws were first passed.  At that time, state enforcement by elected officials 
was an important part of the antitrust enforcement landscape; indeed, state 
enforcement in the early period of the antitrust laws was in some ways 
ahead of federal antitrust enforcement.102  By 1914 some in Congress were 
ready to give state attorneys general the right to bring suit in the name of 
the United States if the U.S. Attorney General did not act—an amendment 
to the proposed Clayton Act that failed in the Senate.103 
Today’s critique goes beyond the fear expressed in the 1914 debate that 
publicity-hungry state attorneys general would be incentivized to go after 
“larger matters” more properly of concern to federal enforcers (that would 
arguably be a good result).  Today’s critique is that elected state enforcers 
are too easily captured by bad political actors, such as labor interests or in-
state companies hurt by competition from out-of-state firms, and are not 
competent professionals in any event.104  The capture argument reflects the 
fact that some popular political interests may disagree with a purer form of 
antitrust than the technocracy likes.  The competency argument is an 
 
Jones Harbour eds., 2d ed. 2002) (describing state and federal interaction in several 
significant antitrust cases from the 1990s). 
 101.  See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (attorneys general are popularly elected in 43 states; the 
remaining states have a variety of selection mechanisms). 
 102. Compare United States v. Int’l Harvester Co., 214 F. 987, 999–1000 (D. Minn. 
1914) (federal antitrust suit filed April 30, 1912) (finding the combination of five companies, 
collectively holding 80 to 85 percent of the market, to form International Harvester to be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act), with 
State v. Int’l Harvester Co., 141 S.W. 672, 678 (Mo. 1911) (finding International Harvester 
to be “an unlawful combination to suppress competition” in violation of state antitrust law). 
See generally May, supra note 15, at 498–506. 
 103. The amendment failed by a vote of 21–39.  For discussion of the amendment, see 51 
CONG. REC. 14,513–26 (1914).  Proponents of the amendment argued that federal 
enforcement had been lax, that the amendment would put “46 watchdogs on guard,” and that 
the “best enforcement” had actually come from state attorneys general acting under more 
limited state law. See id. at 14,515, 14,519.  Critics were concerned about “divided 
responsibility” in the enforcement of federal law and the “temptation” for state attorneys 
general to “get more publicity” by taking up the “larger matters” of federal enforcement. Id. 
at 14,519. 
 104. See Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, supra note 99, at 940–41. 
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unwarranted slur on the ability of relatively poorly paid state lawyers to 
understand the complexities of the antitrust laws (just like juries!).  The 
empirical record, however, provides little evidence either for the capture or 
competence critique.105 
The fact that state attorneys general are popularly elected gives them 
incentives to pursue enforcement actions that benefit the electorate 
generally and of which the general electorate might approve.  These 
incentives appear to have worked, for the record shows that the states have 
historically been interested in using the antitrust laws to obtain monetary 
damages on behalf of state government entities and state consumers injured 
by antitrust violations.106  The U.S. Justice Department, on the other hand, 
has been indifferent to seeking such redress, despite its statutory right to sue 
for treble damages when the federal government is injured by an antitrust 
violator.107  The states also continue to take a firmer stance against vertical 
resale price fixing out of a concern for the interests of consumers who they 
believe will benefit from price competition among sellers of the same brand 
of goods.  By contrast, federal enforcers now simply ignore such 
behavior.108  Thus, the institutional structure of having a popularly elected 
enforcement official may better align the interests of consumers and the 
interests of enforcers, a virtuous result from the point of view of antitrust. 
It is true that state attorneys general who enforce the antitrust laws need 
to be on guard that their enforcement does not end up protecting 
competitors from competition.  They, too, need to maintain “free markets 
for free people.”  But so, too, do unelected federal enforcers who are also 
subject to political pressures from affected groups (whether in favor of 
enforcement or against it).  But at least state enforcers have other direct 
political interests that can counterbalance protectionist forces.  Federal 
enforcers may lack that political counterweight, unless they are smart 
enough to cultivate such support. 
Even if we are not likely to start electing our federal antitrust enforcers, 
we can still pay closer attention to other mechanisms that can make 
bureaucratic enforcers more accountable to the democratic will.  The 
primary mechanism is transparency of decision making.  Although the DOJ 
 
 105. See Harry First, Delivering Remedies:  The Role of the States in Antitrust 
Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004, 1029–31 (2001). 
 106. See id. at 1018 tbl.5 (New York state monetary awards); First, supra note 100, at 300 
(recent cases).  The states’ interest in monetary recoveries dates to the early days of the 
Sherman Act. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 
(1906) (antitrust damages suit for overcharges by iron water pipe cartel). 
 107. See Harry First, Lost in Conversation:  The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law 
48–61 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 10-14, 2010), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1229&context=nyu_lewp (detailing the lack 
of enforcement). 
 108. Compare Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900 
(2007) (Department of Justice and FTC urge application of the rule of reason to minimum 
resale price maintenance agreements), with People v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 916 N.Y.S.2d 
900 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (suit brought by New York State Attorney General under state law for 
resale price maintenance) (dismissed), aff’d, 944 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div. 2012). 
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and FTC engage in a variety of practices to foster transparency, including 
the issuance of enforcement guidelines and business review letters, both 
agencies still lag in disclosing their reasons for settling or not bringing 
particular cases.  Both agencies have issued closing statements on a 
sporadic basis, but even these statements are often less than candid with 
regard to the agency’s decisions.109  This lack of transparency is another 
example of antitrust’s democracy deficit. 
D.  Europe’s Democracy Deficit in Competition Law 
While the United States antitrust system has increased its democracy 
deficit, the European Union has narrowed its own in the competition law 
field.  Over the last ten years, the EU has gone from the originator of the 
very term “democracy deficit” toward a new, more decentralized system of 
competition enforcement with a serious commitment to more transparency, 
accountability, private litigation, and aggregating small claims through 
collective and representative actions. 
At its inception, the EU’s democracy deficit carried over into the 
competition area.  The EU Commission was selected as the exclusive 
enforcer of EU (then EEC) competition law.110 The Commission had the 
exclusive power to both bring proceedings for fines against undertakings 
and to grant exemptions for otherwise unlawful agreements under what is 
now article 101(3) of the EU Treaty.111  It also had the power to issue block 
exemptions for categories of agreements that met certain listed criteria.  It 
could further sculpt the law through the issuance of negative clearances, 
comfort letters, guidelines, and notices.  One notable example is the so-
called de minimis notice, which effectively exempts most conduct by firms 
below certain turnover and market share thresholds as not likely to amount 
to a matter of EU concern.112 
The combined effect of these functionally exclusive positive and negative 
powers gave the Commission almost complete control over the enforcement 
of EU competition law.  Although member states, through what are now 
called National Competition Authorities (NCAs), could enforce their own 
 
 109. The FTC tends to be more candid than the DOJ, in part because dissenting 
commissioners are able to articulate the arguments in favor of enforcement, thereby 
requiring greater explanation from the majority of Commissioners. See, e.g., Press Release, 
FTC Closes Its Investigation of Genzyme Corp.’s 2001 Acquisition of Novazyme Pharm., 
Inc. (Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/genzyme.shtm (with links 
to statements by Chairman Muris and Commissioner Harbour and dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Thompson); see also First et al., supra note 85, at 367–73 (discussing the 
variety of disclosure practices of the federal antitrust enforcement agencies). 
 110. Council Regulation 17/62, 1959–1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87. 
 111. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
101(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 89 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF. 
 112. Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably 
Restrict Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (de minimis), 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13–15, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:368:0013:0015:EN:PDF. 
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national competition laws, they could not grant or adjudicate claims of 
exemption.  This proved to be a nearly insurmountable obstacle where the 
Commission had acted, was considering acting, or the where the parties 
could make a colorable claim that their conduct was exemptible by the 
Commission, which then needed years to complete its own internal 
processes because of the extent of its own caseload.113 
Similarly, although competition law has direct effect in the member 
states, and private parties have a legally protected right to seek damages and 
other remedies for violations of EU competition law,114 private litigation 
has not provided a meaningful remedy for most of the history of the EU.  
Competition claims surfaced offensively and defensively in various 
commercial and intellectual property disputes, but their effective resolution 
was hampered by the inability of national courts to definitively interpret and 
grant the exemptions exclusively within the purview of the EU 
Commission.115  Despite clear statements of the need and the right of 
victims of competition offenses to seek compensation, such claims were 
few and far between because of procedural limitations in the national 
courts, including bans or limitations on discovery and the lack of 
mechanisms to aggregate claims akin to U.S. class actions.116 
All of these issues were addressed in the Modernization Initiative, which 
the Council of the European Union adopted in a package of legislative 
enactments in 2004117 following a rich and intense public debate within the 
various bodies of the EU, national political actors, the bar, academia, and 
civil society more generally.  First, the Commission surrendered its 
exclusive powers over individual exemptions.118  Second, national 
competition authorities and courts would now have the power, and indeed 
the obligation, to apply the full provisions of EU competition law both as to 
liability and exemption.119  Third, the European Competition Network was 
 
 113. See generally Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, The Modernization of European 
Antitrust Enforcement:  The Economics of Regulatory Competition, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
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 115. IVO VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANÇOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 12–13 (5th ed. 2010). 
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 117. See Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:001:0001:0025:EN:PDF, amended by 
Council Regulation 411/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 68) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:068:0001:0002:EN:PDF; Council Regulation 
1419/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 269) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:269:0001:0003:EN:PDF. 
 118. See Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 117, art. 1–3, 6. 
 119. Id. art. 3, 5–6. 
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created to clarify the responsibilities and cooperation between the central 
authority in Brussels and the national competition authorities in the twenty-
seven member states in investigations and proceedings.120  Finally, the 
Commission initiated a program to encourage private rights of action in the 
member state courts.121 
The undoing of the former system both increased and decreased the 
powers of the Competition Directorate of the European Commission.  This 
change eliminated the need for spending a vast amount of time and 
resources processing requests for negative clearances, individual 
exemptions, and more informal comfort letters, and allowed the 
Commission to focus on bigger-ticket cartel, abuse of dominance, and 
merger cases while still setting overall policy for the Community through 
the continued enactment of block exemptions and other forms of guidance 
to the NCAs, national courts, and private parties. 
This change pushed the power and the obligation to enforce both the 
prohibitions and exemptions of EU competition law down to the NCAs and 
national courts.  While the NCAs are themselves technocracies, they are 
one level closer to the people of the EU and the more democratic 
institutions of the member states than the Commission in Brussels.  The 
allocation of jurisdiction among the member states and between the 
member states and the Commission is spelled out more clearly in a 
legislative instrument that the member states directly participated in 
creating.  While the Commission retains the power to trump member states’ 
action under certain circumstances, it has wisely refrained from exercising 
these powers so far. 
Unlike the war on the private right of action in the United States, the 
Commission has actively supported an enhanced right of compensation for 
private parties and does not appear to view this development as a threat to 
its leniency program or cartel enforcement activity.  While progress has 
slowed, at least two U.S. law firms have established an office in the EU 
with an eye toward bringing private damages cases for cartel victims.122  A 
2008 White Paper and a 2012 Commission study illustrates the extent of 
private rights of action in the various states and outlines methods of proof 
and a series of recommendations for greater use of collective and 
representative actions to allow aggregate litigation of small claims.123  The 
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continued development of individual and collective private rights of action 
in the EU has been marked by a robust public debate at the highest levels of 
community and national governmental institutions and among stakeholders 
in civil society.  Contrast this to the way that the private rights “debate” in 
the United States has been handled, where an ever-increasing set of 
restrictions has been judicially enacted in a technical and obfuscating 
manner that both preempts and limits public response. 
Finally, the EU Competition law system includes procedural safeguards 
for public participation that are absent in the United States.  While the 
Commission may proceed on its own initiative, when the EU receives a 
complaint from a private party it is generally required to formally decide, 
with reasons, whether to open a formal investigation or not, although it has 
the discretion to prioritize matters with the greatest community interests.124  
A decision not to proceed at any stage is appealable by the complainant and 
certain other entities affected by the decision.125  Although the Commission 
is granted substantial discretion by the courts, it must nonetheless explain 
itself both in its decision and in court, unlike the virtually unlimited 
discretion of the U.S. agencies not to proceed in a matter with only 
occasional and entirely voluntary closing memos to explain their 
decisions.126 
No administrative system, whether deemed law enforcement or 
regulation, is ever entirely democratic in a modern complex economy.  
However, EU competition law shows the value of a system which takes 
subsidiarity seriously, makes an effort to encourage both public and private 
enforcement at the expense of unaccountable centralization, and subjects all 
stages of the investigative process at the EU level to binding rules of 
administrative law and judicial review.  It is all the more remarkable since 
the EU Commission had the full powers of a technocratic enforcer and 
chose to move in the opposite direction. 
II.  TECHNOCRACY AND IDEOLOGY 
While reasonable people can debate what set of rules, institutions, and 
procedures produce the “best” competition policy,127 that is not the main 
thrust of the current push for a technocratic antitrust order.  Instead, there is 
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1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (under the Tunney Act, a court cannot reject a proposed consent 
decree on the grounds that the complaint should have been broader). 
 127. See generally Symposium, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411 (2010). 
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a strong laissez-faire ideological underpinning for many of the advocates of 
such an approach that favors the near abolition of antitrust without having 
to engage the political sphere that has never favored such a result. 
Technocracy does not have to equate with restricting enforcement.  The 
later New Deal era, when Thurman Arnold headed the Antitrust Division, is 
one illustration of a move toward technocracy in the service of increased 
enforcement.128  Most of the early enforcement history of the EU is another.  
In fact, technocracy versus a more politically responsive antitrust and more 
enforcement versus less are two separate variables with a number of 
historical variations, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Enforcement:  Technocracy and Political Antitrust 
 
 Technocratic Antitrust Politically Accountable 
Antitrust
More 
Enforcement 
Later New Deal (e.g., Socony-
Vacuum; Alcoa); early EU 
competition enforcement
Post WWII, Warren 
Court (e.g., Brown 
Shoe, Morton Salt) 
Laissez-faire 
Enforcement  
Roberts Court (e.g., Twombly, 
Trinko) 
Early New Deal 
statutes; Appalachian 
Coals 
 
The ideological thrust of the current move to both technocracy and 
laissez-faire can best be illustrated in two related critiques of antitrust 
substance, procedures, and institutions.  These critiques, if accepted, 
inexorably lead to, at best, a shrunken antitrust world with almost exclusive 
federal enforcement of the narrowest set possible of antitrust principles 
before increasingly hostile courts.  It would also mean the effective 
abolition of private and state antitrust enforcement as a meaningful 
constraint on the commercial marketplace, all without a meaningful public 
debate for this extraordinary step. 
The first critique involves the longstanding debate over the use of per se 
rules versus a rule of reason approach for antitrust offenses.  Developed 
originally as a rule of interpretation for section 1 of the Sherman Act, a 
version of the rule of reason approach has spread to govern virtually all of 
antitrust including monopolization and merger analysis.129  Although per se 
rules were once common, the Supreme Court has told us that such rules are 
only applicable to those offenses that are manifestly anticompetitive and 
wholly lacking any plausible procompetitive justification.130  At the same 
time, it is easier and easier with the help of skilled economic expertise to 
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assert a procompetitive justification that the courts will find plausible, 
thereby taking the case out of the realm of per se analysis. 
The courts have often fumbled the application of this core principle 
largely as a result of Justice Brandeis’s ill-advised kitchen sink approach to 
the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,131 where 
everything is relevant and nothing is determinative.  Chicago Board of 
Trade produced two different reactions.  The first was a series of per se 
rules for various practices where the plaintiff always (or nearly always) 
won, and where the defendant always (or nearly always) won everything 
else when labeled rule of reason.  Whether justified or not, this system fell 
into disrepair as most practices, except hardcore cartel behavior, became 
subject to some form of the rule of reason. 
This in turn led to the criticism by some that the rule of reason cannot be 
effectively applied by generalist courts and lay juries, and the criticism by 
others that the rule of reason violates the rule of law.132  These criticisms, of 
course, were a major part of the reasoning in adopting per se rules in the 
first place, that is, to better calibrate the substantive rules to the procedures 
and institutions of the generalist judiciary.133  The problem is that if the rule 
of reason is the default standard, and if you then conclude that courts cannot 
administer these types of cases, there is nothing left to antitrust except 
governmental challenges to the most naked price fixing arrangements.  This 
requires a conscious political decision never contemplated, let alone 
endorsed, by Congress.  Few argue in such stark terms,134 but technocratic 
antitrust short-circuits the political process and can lead down a path to 
laissez-faire. 
The other response was to develop an intermediate or sliding scale 
standard for behavior in between conduct that was unlikely to harm 
competition and conduct that was inevitably likely to do so.  The Supreme 
Court developed the so-called quick-look standard in a series of cases in 
which Justice Stevens often spoke for the Court.135  At the same time, the 
FTC developed the similar inherently suspect test in administrative 
proceedings and litigation in the lower courts.136  The gist of both 
approaches is that in situations where a rudimentary knowledge of 
economics would show that an agreement is likely to raise price, reduce 
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output, or otherwise injure an important element of market competition, 
harm may be presumed and the initial burden of proof should be shifted to 
the defendant to justify the restraint.137  Unfortunately, this promising 
approach was cut short by the Supreme Court’s opaque decision in 
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,138 which held that the quick look was 
appropriate in some cases, just not in this particular case, but then said 
nothing more as to when, where, and how the quick look might apply in 
future cases.139 
The second, and more troubling, critique of antitrust enforcement has 
been the widespread adoption of a truncated version of decision theory, 
which was originally developed in the computer science, statistical, and 
business literatures.  What has come to be known as error cost analysis 
derives from the decision theory and related game theory approaches 
developed by John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern dating back to the 
1940s.140 
 
Table 2:  Decision Theory Versus Error Cost Analysis 
 
 Take Action Do Nothing
Assess Correctly Benefit A (True Positive) Benefit B (True Negative) 
Assess Incorrectly Cost C (False Positive) Cost D (False Negative) 
 
Most versions of decision theory involve the construction of a two-by-
two matrix in the form shown in Table 2.  The matrix shows the anticipated 
benefits and costs if the decision maker selects a particular rule for the 
system (for example, choosing between the per se rule and the rule of 
reason to judge a particular business practice).  The top row shows the 
anticipated benefits for the choices made by the decision maker.  These are 
usually referred to as true positives and true negatives.  Prohibiting conduct 
that should be lawful (Type I error) or incorrectly permitting harmful 
conduct (Type II error) is usually referred to as false positives and false 
negatives.  In some models, the costs of operating the system itself are also 
included in analyzing whether optimal results occur.  In most models the 
combined accuracy benefits obtained when the parties act correctly are 
weighed against the combined error costs (and system costs) to evaluate the 
value of the rule or decision in question.  The ultimate question remains 
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what set of rules, procedures, and institutions minimize the total costs of 
getting it wrong or maximize the benefits of getting it right. 
Scholars in many areas of the law have applied decision theory in 
formulating and evaluating rules, procedures, and institutions.  These 
include criminal, constitutional, contract, and most forms of regulatory 
law.141  Professor Brett Frischmann has called the assessment of the 
predicted benefits of getting it right “accuracy benefits.”142  Numerous 
scholars have referred to the assessment of the predicted costs of getting it 
wrong as “error costs.”143  Most of the time the analysis includes both the 
predicted benefits of getting it right measured against the predicted costs of 
getting it wrong. 
In contrast, antitrust law has relied almost entirely on analyzing error 
costs alone.  The introduction of error cost analysis into antitrust 
scholarship came in then-Professor Frank Easterbrook’s 1984 article, The 
Limits of Antitrust.144  This article has been widely cited and incorporated 
into many bodies of scholarship and a growing number of judicial 
opinions.145 
The danger of this particular form of error cost analysis is that it 
systematically undervalues all forms of enforcement and can appear to 
provide seemingly neutral technocratic justifications for what is merely a 
normative preference for laissez-faire outcomes.  First, the Easterbrook 
form of error costs ignores the accuracy benefits of any given rule, 
procedure, or enforcement action.  If one seeks to minimize error costs (by 
itself a legitimate exercise) without considering the accuracy benefits, one 
inevitably gets less enforcement activity than should otherwise be the case.  
It is only in the happy coincidence when the magnitude and probabilities of 
accuracy benefits and error costs are reciprocal that this does not result. 
As brilliantly analyzed by Michael Jacobs and Alan Devlin, this form of 
error cost analysis also assumes that all false positives are long lasting, 
businesses lack effective alternative lawful strategies, and all false negatives 
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will be quickly and effectively neutralized by the market.146  These 
assumptions are unlikely to be true in all cases, but most error cost analysis 
in antitrust does not even attempt to make the fine-grained adjustments to 
determine when such assumptions may be justified in the real world. 
Moreover, error cost analysts frequently fail to undertake the basic task 
of calculating the error cost of a particular rule or system under their own 
limiting assumptions.  There is little attempt to assess the available 
empirical data as to the costs of Type I and Type II errors beyond the 
assumptions that Type I errors are harmful and Type II errors are benign.  
This type of analysis is more properly a restatement of the critic’s prior 
assumptions and beliefs, rather than of the application of error cost analysis 
to solve problems in the real world. 
Combining today’s error cost approach with today’s rule of reason 
approach ends up reducing antitrust enforcement to a near null set.  There 
may be situations where the rule of reason is beyond the capabilities of 
general courts.  There may be situations where error costs counsel against a 
finding of liability or the adoption of a particular legal test.  But these are 
not inevitable nor merely the product of a preference for technocratic 
administration.  Nor are those results in any particular case an argument for 
less (or more) antitrust in all cases. 
Such arguments are, in the absence of empirical support on a case-by-
case basis, primarily a preference for a laissez-faire marketplace.  Laissez-
faire politics or economics is a legitimate normative preference even if it is 
not our cup of tea.  But that is a debate that must be settled in any particular 
era, and revisited as needed, by the broader democratic body politic.  The 
role of a technocrat in a society such as ours should be to execute, not 
make, these fundamental value choices. 
III.  WHY MORE DEMOCRACY IS GOOD FOR ANTITRUST 
In this Article we have argued for a rebalancing of antitrust’s institutional 
approach, away from technocracy and toward democracy.  Such a 
rebalancing could result in important substantive changes in antitrust 
doctrines and litigation results.  Courts in Sherman Act cases would need to 
pay more attention to the Act’s statutory purposes, particularly with regard 
to protecting businesses from exclusionary conduct, and would be less 
willing to view themselves as unconstrained lawmakers, free to follow the 
economic theory du jour.  Merger law would pay attention to concentration, 
not just as a screen for case consideration, but as an independent concern 
that Congress had when passing the Clayton Act.  Juries would be returned 
to their role of evaluating business behavior in its factual context.  
Predatory campaigns that exclude rivals would not be excused on the 
ground that such behavior made no economic sense to judges who could not 
figure out why such campaigns would be profitable.  Claims of collusive 
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behavior would not be dismissed because judges could think up a plausible 
explanation for why the defendants might not have colluded.  Congress 
would not leave antitrust law to the professional mercies of the federal 
enforcement agencies, antitrust lawyers, and economists.  Serious 
legislative revision would be debated and undertaken. 
Perhaps as importantly, an institutional rebalance will have a procedural 
side.  Consider the following thought experiment:  Why don’t antitrust 
enforcement agencies resemble the Federal Reserve Board?  The Federal 
Reserve was created in 1913 to furnish an elastic currency, to discount 
commercial paper, and to establish a more effective system of supervising 
the U.S. banking system.147  It is profoundly and deliberately 
antidemocratic in nature.  Its proceedings are closed, it hears no evidence, 
and affected parties have no participatory rights.  While its Board of 
Governors is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, it is 
largely self-regulating and self-funded.  Its chairmen typically are 
reappointed regardless of the party in control of the White House, and its 
actions are supposed to be free from political control.  Congressional 
oversight is largely limited to hectoring the chairman.  In the recent 
financial crisis, the Fed exercised extraordinary powers at or beyond its 
stated powers in an effort to prevent a worldwide economic collapse.148  
Outside the United States, most of the national central states enjoy similar 
powers and similar degrees of independence within their own economies.149 
But antitrust agencies are not like the Fed.  Most importantly, the 
democratic choices made when the antitrust agencies were created were 
fundamentally different from the choices made when the Fed was created.  
Public and private antitrust enforcement were set up to enforce the law in a 
way that would advance democratic goals—to deal with concentrations of 
economic power and to police business behavior that exploited consumers 
and excluded competitors.  When the Department of Justice did not carry 
out that mandate adequately, Congress established a second agency “to stop 
monopoly in the embryo” and to check the lassitude of the Department.  
The political choice for the Fed was fundamentally different, a democratic 
precommitment to insulate the Fed from any popular political pressure to 
manipulate the money supply.  Stability in monetary policy was so 
preferred to volatility that the constraints of democratic control were 
substantially weakened. 
Of course, few would want a system of antitrust enforcement that 
operates in a totally partisan fashion.  One can imagine (but not desire) a 
world where competition policy wildly gyrates depending on election 
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results, appointments are dictated by party loyalty without regard to 
expertise,150 certainty is an illusion, and each enforcement decision is 
second guessed by Congress as is the case with too many executive branch 
and theoretically independent agency decisions. 
Redressing antitrust’s democracy deficit on the procedural side can be 
done with the tools of administrative law.  Administrative law is the body 
of law that controls the procedures of governmental decision making.151  It 
allows interested persons to participate in decisions that affect their 
interests.  Normally, it requires appropriate notice, the right to be heard, fair 
procedures, protection of fundamental rights, and judicial review of the 
resulting decision.  These basic features are present in the administrative 
laws of most foreign legal systems and are part of a growing international 
consensus.152  The tradeoff is that the decisions of administrative agencies 
that properly follow these strictures normally are granted a degree of 
deference as to the interpretation of the laws they enforce.153  Frequently, 
but not inevitably, private parties also have the right to proceed with actions 
for damages against private parties who violate their regulatory obligations 
and even against the government itself when it acts unlawfully, either 
substantively or procedurally.  These tools of administrative law are 
available to make antitrust enforcement decisions more transparent and 
more responsive to the interests that the antitrust laws were meant to serve, 
thereby promoting both better decision making and greater democratic 
legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Free markets and free people cannot be assured by the efforts of 
technocrats.  Ultimately, both come about through the workings of 
democratic institutions, respectful of the legislature’s goals and constrained 
from engaging in arbitrary action.  Antitrust has moved too far from 
democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in service to a 
laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement.  We need to move the 
needle back.  Doing so will strengthen the institutions of antitrust, the 
market economy, and the democratic branches of government themselves. 
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